Hebb's Accomplishments Misunderstood by Hucka, Michael et al.
___________________________________________________________________________
__
AUTHORS
Michael Hucka (michael.hucka@umich.edu)
  Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
  The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Mark Weaver (mark.weaver@um.cc.umich.edu)
  Corvus Development, Inc., 2088 Georgetown Blvd., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Stephen Kaplan (stephen.kaplan@um.cc.umich.edu)
  Department of Psychology and Department of Electrical Engineering and
  Computer Science, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
___________________________________________________________________________
__
ABSTRACT
While Amit's efforts to provide stronger theoretical and empirical
support for Hebb's cell-assembly concept is admirable, we have serious
reservations about the perspective presented in the target article.
For Hebb, the cell-assembly was a building block; by contrast, the
framework proposed here eschews the need to fit the assembly into a
broader picture of its function.
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COMMENTARY
 HEBB'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS MISUNDERSTOOD
Amit's work represents a significant achievement in understanding and
modeling the dynamics within a Hebbian cell-assembly.  Unfortunately,
the target article also reveals a flawed perspective that we believe
leaves Amit poorly positioned to exploit and build upon his results.
This flawed perspective manifests itself in two ways.  First, he fails
to make contact with both empirical evidence and related models which
could serve to support and inform his own efforts.  (Indeed, there is a
danger that the reader will be left with the impression that the
cell-assembly is only now being rescued from obscurity some 45 years
after Hebb proposed it.)  Of greater concern, however, is the fact that
these failures to make contact are not due to oversight; rather, they
follow from a principled approach to cognitive modeling that involves
deliberate avoidance of a broad cognitive theory.  We argue this is
both strategically flawed and, ironically, in direct conflict with
Hebb's perspective--Amit's position is conceptually much closer to the
behaviorist position.
A BROADER SAMPLING OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS CALLED FOR
The research by Miyashita et al. provides exciting evidence for
cell-assembly structures in the brain.  However, in reading Amit's
article, one may get the impression it is practically the only
evidence.  On the contrary, the research adds to a substantial existing
body of empirical results on the topic.  Direct evidence for maintained
neural activity goes back to at least the 1950's (Burns 1951).
Freeman has long studied EEG activity in the olfactory systems of
rabbits and has developed an attractor model based on the results
(Freeman 1975).  Evidence for reverberatory activity similar to
Miyashita's can be found in several lines of work (e.g., Goldman-Rakic
1990; Miller et al. 1993).  For example, Goldman-Rakic has
studied working memory in prefrontal cortex of monkeys and found
neurons that maintained their activity for several seconds during the
delay period (but not the stimulus presentation) of a delayed-response
visual task.  More recently, Laurent and Davidowitz (1994) reported
detailed evidence for assembly-based representations of odor
information in the olfactory system of locusts.  They proposed that
"odor quality is encoded not only by an assembly of synchronously
oscillating neurons but by a particular succession of different, but
overlapping, oscillating assemblies" (p. 1874).  
A BROADER SAMPLING OF THEORETICAL ISSUES IS CALLED FOR
Amit is surely correct that Hebb's cell-assembly construct has received
less attention than his learning postulate.  As Amit notes, the most
widely studied models of the past decade have been feed-forward
systems--networks which are incompatible with cell-assembly theory
because they are fundamentally incapable of supporting reverberation.
He is not the first to note their limitations; indeed, feed-forward
connectionist models have been accused of constituting a behaviorist
revival (Lachter and Bever 1988; Pinker and Prince 1988; also see
Kaplan et al. 1990).  Nevertheless, the importance of the
cell-assembly concept and of Hebb's "processing cut," as Amit calls it,
has not been lost on researchers.  There are in fact two classes of
connectionist models compatible with the cell-assembly concept, and a
large number of examples in each class.  The first class includes those
such as Hopfield's and Amit's that cast internal representations as
attractors; representative examples include work by Anderson et
al. (1977), Freeman (1975), Kanerva (1984), and Hinton and Sejnowski
(1986).  The second class is closer to Hebb's original conception:
cell-assemblies as distinct subpopulations of neurons.  These
cell-assembly analogues have been variously termed "classification
couples" (Edelman 1987), "recognition codes" (Grossberg 1987), "object
representations" (Kaplan and Kaplan 1982), and "cell-assemblies"
(Braitenberg 1984; Palm 1982).
Amit's attractor neural network, of which we see only a glimpse in the
target article, is an important advance over many existing models in
its coverage of biologically relevant details and the depth of its
theoretical analysis.  But in the context of a proposal for
understanding cognitive phenomena, it must be kept in mind that the
model's scope is quite limited.  If one is going to propose that such
network "modules" are a fundamental component of cognitive function,
one must be prepared to explain something about how they work together
to give rise to more complex phenomena--an issue that has been
addressed in other models (e.g., Edelman 1987; Grossberg 1987;
Kaplan et al. 1990) and indeed in Hebb's own theory.
CELL-ASSEMBLIES AND COGNITIVE THEORY
We believe the preceding issues are symptoms of a deeper problem.  In
his conclusion, Amit suggests that although cell-assemblies may "even
suggest a substrate for psychology itself," constructing such a
theoretical framework is a temptation we should resist, lest we get too
far ahead of ourselves.  He concludes: 
    . . . [T]he lessons learned from these experiments include the one
    which advises restraint. . . . [O]ur imagination concerning brain
    computation is still too much constrained by formal mathematics, by
    computer languages, and by artificial intelligence. . . .
      It is most likely that attending for a while longer to the
    details of the contact between modeling and experiment would keep
    options open which a premature harvest of speculation would
    close. [Sec. 9, p. 22]
But Hebb's Organization of Behavior must rank as one of the great
"premature harvests of speculation" of our time.  Nearly fifty years
later, Hebb's speculations continue to influence the course of
experimental and theoretical brain research, as the present enterprise,
for example, plainly demonstrates.  In contrast, the circumscribed,
bottom-up approach and avoidance of cognitive theory that Amit argues
for is actually very similar to the position taken by the behaviorists.
It is interesting to note just how many of the constraints of the
collective imagination Hebb was able to transcend; in the late 1940's,
psychology was dominated by behaviorism and neuroscientists could offer
direct evidence neither for synaptic learning nor reverberation.
Perhaps even more important than his particular theoretical
contributions is the example Hebb set for how to conduct a dialogue
between cognitive theory and experimental neuroscience, and this Amit
seems to have missed entirely.
This principled avoidance of a larger theoretical framework is not a
purely philosophical problem--it has practical implications for
precisely the kind of research program that Amit favors.  In
particular, if reverberation is to form the basis of a cognitive
theory, the cell-assembly must serve as a building block in a larger,
more complex system--a system which will have its own emergent dynamics
that will influence the individual assemblies.  If one lacks a notion
of the kind of environment in which cell-assemblies function, one is
unlikely to be able to explain fully their operation or explore their
potential.  For this reason, we fear that Amit's results--technically
impressive as they are--will not easily prove to be extendable.
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